tension with industrial organization economics. Bork created a unified goal for antitrust based on a "consumer welfare prescription" to shape the development of the case law. 5 The shaping of U.S. antitrust law to fit Bork's consumer welfare prescription is all the more interesting given that although Bork was not the first to argue that antitrust analysis should focus on industrial organization based economic analysis, he was the first to package these beliefs in an easy-to-understand manner that the courts could implement. 6 While many of Bork's ideas are mainstream now, at the time of publication his writing was highly contentious and the notion of an economics-based consumerwelfare antitrust standard was very controversial.
This essay describes Bork's policy objectives for the antitrust treatment of vertical restraints, explains why Bork had such a disproportionate influence on the subject, and tracks Bork's influence on the development of vertical restraints in three specific areas: maximum resale price maintenance (RPM); vertical territorial restrictions; and Robinson-Patman Act violations. In practice, the shift in the antitrust rules applied to these areas has not been from per se illegality to the rule of reason, but has been a more dramatic shift from per se illegality to presumptive legality under the rule of reason. 8 He reiterated this call for per se legality for vertical 5 BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 2, at 66. 6 Bork had a greater effect on the development of antitrust law than his Chicago contemporaries who used economic analysis, even though Bork's work was less economically sophisticated. Compare the impact of Richard A. Posner's Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective (1976) with The Antitrust Paradox. 7 The three areas studied are unlike more complex vertical restraints such as exclusive dealing, tying, and certain pricing practices (e.g., bundling and loyalty discounts). The three vertical restraints selected tend not to require the difficult balancing of efficiencies versus potential to exclude as much as other vertical restraints, which makes the latter more challenging to analyze. Hence, these three areas are those that are most likely to be able to shift to per se legality in practice. 8 9 In contrast, most others advocating reform of the treatment of vertical restraints favored applying the rule of reason and believed that certain vertical conduct violated the antitrust laws. 10 Bork's vision for per se legality for vertical restraints has been realized, at least partially. For several types of vertical restraints, the rule of reason has in practice meant near per se legality, with a negative safe harbor for particularly egregious behavior.
B. BORK AND THE EFFICIENCY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ANTITRUST
Bork's advocacy of his approach to how to "fix" antitrust connects to the concept of the efficiency of the common law. Richard Posner was the first to 9 BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 2, at 288 ("Analysis shows that every vertical restraint should be completely lawful."). Bork Bork was a bit disingenuous in stating that he was against all vertical restraints. Bork believed that Lorain Journal was correctly decided. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra, at 344-46. In that case, the monopolist daily newspaper in the town of Lorain, Ohio, refused ads by advertisers who also placed ads with Lorain Journal's only other potential media rivals, the local radio stations. The Supreme Court held that "forcing advertisers to boycott a competing radio station violated § 2." Lorain Journal, 342 U.S. at 152. For Bork, Lorain Journal's intent was predatory, as it wanted to bankrupt the radio stations and gain their FCC licenses. He also noted that there was no efficiency justification for Lorain Journal's behavior. BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra, at 345.
Even after the publication of The Antitrust Paradox, Bork found similar situations that had vertical elements that raised legitimate antitrust concern. The key to understanding why certain vertical behavior still deserved antitrust scrutiny and not automatic per se legal condemnation had to do with efficiencies. Bork 10 See, e.g., POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 6, at 171 ("Some economists believe that it is virtually impossible for a firm or group of firms ever to exclude competitors or potential competitors from the market unless they have lower costs. . . . I do not share this view. ").
hypothesize that the common law led to more efficient legal rules.
11 The explanation for the efficiency of the common law is that when a judge makes an incorrect ruling, an economically disadvantaged party will challenge the rule because the disadvantage is greater than the advantage to the beneficiary of the rule. Antitrust, which is a broad statutory regime governed by common law, fits within the efficiency of the common law paradigm. 12 As a result, with advances in economic knowledge, antitrust law shifts to more efficient legal rules over time, as disadvantaged parties challenge inefficient rules and use economic analysis to change them. 13 Antitrust jurisprudence and economic analysis in the 1950s and 1960s was hostile to procompetitive interpretations of vertical restraints.
14 Starting with Donald Turner, some have called this antitrust's "inhospitality tradition." 15 Bork's contribution to transforming antitrust's inhospitality tradition was to increase the shift to more efficient rules, especially in those areas of greatest inefficiency of legal rules (maximum RPM, territorial restrictions, and Robinson-Patman). simple rules 16 and a straightforward singular goal of antitrust, 17 antitrust doctrine and practice could be improved. 18 He did so through a clear and accessible writing style that fused Harvard School considerations of administrability and legal process with Chicago School economic-based analysis 19 -a factor that made it possible for judges to easily process and apply Bork's writing. The mix of the two traditions promoted the case law shift. 20 Bork's writing was brilliant in using clear prose 21 to make points that were sometimes analytically deceptive. Bork convincingly made the seemingly counterintuitive case that abandoning per se illegality for the rule of reason would simplify antitrust. Bork understood that, in practice, the push to rule of reason would actually lead to presumptive or even per se legality. Because the details of particular practices matter for a rule of reason analysis, the shift to rule of reason creates various evidentiary hurdles for plaintiffs and increases the cost of litigation. The use of the rule of reason would thereby serve as a 16 BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 2, at 72 ("The need of the law generally is for the systematic development of normative models of judicial behavior, models which, while they cannot attain, will at least distantly approach the rigor of the descriptive models of basic economic theory. Until we have such models, criticism of the courts for having the wrong goals will generally be empty, the mere assertion of a different set of personal preferences."). 17 Id. 21 Many theorists in the economics tradition lacked Bork's prose or his almost religious fervor for the correctness of his position. See, e.g., BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 2, at 285 ("Antitrust is capable of sustaining meaningless distinctions and sterile paradoxes, but those of Schwinn were too many and too obvious to persist for long."); id. at 382 ("[The RobinsonPatman Act is] the misshapen progeny of intolerable draftsmanship coupled with wholly mistaken economic theory.").
screen to weed out weaker cases in which there was an efficiency justification for the restraint.
Bork also benefited from good timing: his influence is partially attributable to the publication date of The Antitrust Paradox. The book was mostly ready for publication by 1969, but it was delayed because of the illness of Bork's first wife and his appointment as Solicitor General. As a result, the book was published in 1978, just as the Chicago shift began in the Supreme Court. Bork's position as Solicitor General allowed the Supreme Court to get to know Bork well, which likely gave Bork's writing greater credence. 22 It also allowed Bork to train and influence many of the attorneys who would argue before the Supreme Court for the next generation.
Bork's policy prescriptions became part of formal government policy starting in the Reagan administration. 23 This led to a significant decline in federal enforcement against vertical restraints. Government challenges to vertical practices (and civil non-merger cases in general) have never recovered to preReagan levels. 24 
II. STRUCTURAL SHIFTS IN THE CASE LAW ON VERTICAL RESTRAINTS
The Chicago School's impact on vertical restraints and business behavior was uneven. Certain types of conduct, such as exclusive dealing, continued to receive significant scrutiny. But in three areas-maximum RPM, non-price restraints, and Robinson-Patman Act violations, Bork's writing (and advocacy in front of the Supreme Court in the case of Robinson-Patman) helped cause the case law to push aside per se illegality rules in favor of de facto per se legality. The result was more aggressive vertical behavior by businesses, as they realized that there was little legal risk to conduct that previously had been per se unlawful. 25 22 Id. 25 This suggests Bork's work has had even more influence than is reflected in the case law alone. However, direct demonstrations of these changes are difficult. Consequently, this essay identifies Bork's influence on possible correlations between shifts in business behavior and shifts in case law by examining the empirical work on vertical contracting specific to the doctrinal shifts discussed.
A. MAXIMUM RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
The origins of per se illegality for maximum RPM emerged from Socony Vacuum. 26 In that case, Justice Douglas created an expansive per se rule that prohibited "raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce." 27 The Supreme Court reaffirmed the per se prohibition through dicta in Kiefer-Stewart, which involved liquor dealers and maximum prices. 28 These cases served as precursors to one of the worst antitrust decisions of the past 50 years. In 1968, the Supreme Court held maximum RPM to be per se illegal in Albrecht v. Herald Co. 29 The Court reasoned that suppliers may choose the wrong price. 30 The Court also showed concern that maximum RPM could easily become a minimum price and lead to collusion.
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Case law began to chip away at the Albrecht per se rule in Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co. (ARCO). 32 In its ARCO decision, the Court did not overturn Albrecht, 33 but noted that it might be willing to overturn Albrecht if the question were to come before it. 34 In doing so, the Court noted the scholarship of Bork and others that was critical of per se rules for maximum RPM. 35 In 41 the Supreme Court applied the rule of reason to exclusive territories that a manufacturer assigned to its distributors and dealers. The Court stated that it applied the rule of reason because "[w]e do not know enough of the economic and business stuff out of which these arrangements emerge to be certain." 42 This victory for economic sense was short-lived. Only four years later, in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 43 the Court revisited whether vertical non-price restraints should be analyzed as per se unlawful or under the rule of reason. The Court held the territorial restrictions per se illegal based on the rationale that they impeded the economic viability of small (and often inefficient) businesses. 44 Bork's harsh response was that "Schwinn's result was not only wrong, but its rationale verged on mere wittiness." 45 37 Id. at 16. 38 The results come from a Westlaw search conducted in August 2013. 39 The paucity of cases suggests that maximum RPM cases never should have been per se illegal. That some cases were decided on antitrust injury grounds provides evidence to support the theoretical claim made first by Blair and Lang in 1991 (before State Oil) that "[i]t is readily apparent that the victim of maximum resale price fixing has not suffered antitrust injury. " 44 Id. at 382 ("Once the manufacturer has parted with title and risk, he has parted with dominion over the product, and his effort thereafter to restrict territory or persons to whom the product may be transferred-whether by explicit agreement or by silent combination or understanding with his vendee-is a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act."). 45 Bork, Vertical Restraints, supra note 1, at 172.
A decade later, the Supreme Court overturned Schwinn in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc. 46 The Court held that non-price restrictions would be analyzed under the rule of reason. In doing so, the Sylvania Court relied heavily on Bork (five citations to his work) to recognize that non-price restrictions enhanced interbrand competition from manufacturer efficiencies created by vertical restraints. 47 Sylvania specifically addressed territorial restrictions, but it also signaled a broad shift across all of antitrust to the use of the rule of reason instead of per se illegality for conduct that did not involve horizontal price agreements. Bork made just such an argument shortly after Sylvania. He explained:
Sylvania holds the promise of fundamental reform, not only in the law of vertical restraints but in antitrust generally. The present misshapen look of antitrust doctrine is due in large measure to the Supreme Court's habit of regarding business efficiency as either irrelevant or harmful. . . . The Court's Sylvania opinion not only counted efficiencies in favor of a challenged business practice but did so in a sophisticated way, perceiving that the elimination or mitigation of competition among a manufacturer's dealers was essential to the achievement of certain distributional efficiencies. Moreover, in resting its decision on those grounds, the Court necessarily accepted the premise that the antitrust laws are, primarily if not solely, concerned with consumer welfare.
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In an analysis of cases decided through 1991, Judge Douglas Ginsburg examined all federal appellate decisions that cited Sylvania on the merits. He found that defendants succeeded more than 90 percent of the time. 49 Ginsburg concluded that the law had moved to de facto per se legality where the conduct of a monopolist is not at issue. This work has not been updated in a manner that breaks down cases in the same way, although Michael Carrier finds that in 84 percent of all rule of reason cases , the plaintiff cannot show an anticompetitive effect; 50 likewise, in the following 20 years 46 433 U.S. 36 (1977) . 47 Id. at 56, 66-69 nn.8-10. The majority cited to his work as authority as an "economist" regarding promoting intrabrand competition for efficient distribution, on the limitations of Schwinn (in the concurrence by Justice White), twice on the goal of economic efficiency in antitrust (in the concurrence by Justice White), and on how the procompetitive justifications of exclusive territories also apply in the case of RPM (in the concurrence by Justice White). 48 Bork, Vertical Restraints, supra note 1, at 172. Even though Sylvania signaled an important change to a more efficient rule, in the immediate period after Sylvania its importance remained controversial in the lower courts, in part because Sylvania's market share was a mere 5 percent at the time of trial, suggesting that it lacked the market power necessary to cause anticompetitive effects. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 38. 49 59 In the pre-Antitrust Paradox era, the most important primary line Robinson-Patman case was Utah Pie, 60 a decision that Bork strongly criticized. 61 The case alleged a coordinated pricing scheme by three large national firms against a local firm that reduced the price of pies. The Supreme Court found for the plaintiff Utah Pie, even though such an outcome favored a competitor over consumers. 62 As a result of the case, inefficient competitors could defend themselves against more efficient competitors by using Robinson-Patman.
Secondary line injury cases were equally problematic. The seminal preAntitrust Paradox case in this area was Morton Salt. 63 Based on an assumption that price discrimination led to adverse competitive effects, the Supreme Court, without any showing of actual consumer harm, condemned the volume discount price discrimination used by Morton Salt. 64 Brooke Group marked the end of plaintiffs' victories in primary line cases. 65 Brooke Group, a small competitor, sued Brown & Williamson under Robinson-Patman for primary-line price discrimination, alleging both discriminatory and below cost discounts. The Supreme Court held that for a plaintiff to prevail, (1) the defendant's price must be below some measure of its costs, and (2) the defendant must have a reasonable prospect of recoupment of its below-cost price losses. 66 The recoupment prong eviscerated the Utah Pie standard and made it nearly impossible in practice for plaintiffs to win a primary line Robinson-Patman claim going forward. Doctrinally, the case is important because it led to a structural shift in primary line Robinson-Patman case outcomes.
Justice unilaterally refused to enforce Robinson-Patman and advocated for its repeal. 73 This constitutes a fundamental structural shift. 74 The empirical scholarship on private Robinson-Patman decided cases shows a significant shift in its use within the United States. 75 One study that collects 28 years of data from private Robinson-Patman decided cases finds a shift in case frequency and in outcome starting in 1982. 76 From 1982 to 1993 (up through Brooke Group), private plaintiffs were successful in 35 percent of decided cases. 77 In sharp contrast, in the 2006-2010 period (post-Volvo) the success rate for plaintiffs decreased to less than 5 percent of the time in the 47 decided cases; none of those successes were in primary line Robinson-Patman cases. 78 If the decided cases are the close cases and/or they shape future business behavior, this suggests that businesses have taken a more aggressive stance regarding price discrimination than they did at the time of The Antitrust Paradox. This outcome may signal a shift to a pricing policy position risk assessment of antitrust risk for Robinson-Patman that is closer to an outcome of per se legality (or at the least presumptively legal), with a negative presumption only in outlier cases. 79 vertical restraints from per se illegality to a rule of reason. As shown, in practice, rule of reason treatment makes a number of these practices presumptively legal. This presumptively legal rule of reason in combination with procedural rules that benefit defendants brings certain antitrust conduct closer to Bork's stated goal of per se legality for vertical restraints. It remains to be seen if, with more time, the Bork revolution will become complete with per se illegality eliminated for all but naked cartels and replaced with de facto presumptive legality under the rule of reason or even per se legality.
